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Abstract: Although slurs are conventionally defined as derogatory 
words, it has been widely noted that not all of their occurrences are 
derogatory. This may lead us to think that there are “innocent” occur-
rences of slurs, i.e., occurrences of slurs that are not harmful in any 
sense. The aim of this paper is to challenge this assumption. Our thesis 
is that slurs are always potentially harmful, even if some of their oc-
currences are nonderogatory. Our argument is the following. Deroga-
tory occurrences of slurs are not characterized by their sharing any 
specific linguistic form; instead, they are those that take place in what 
we call uncontrolled contexts, that is, contexts in which we do not have 
enough knowledge of our audience to predict what the uptake of the 
utterance will be. Slurs uttered in controlled contexts, by contrast, may 
lack derogatory character. However, although the kind of context at 
which the utterance of a slur takes place can make it nonderogatory, it 
cannot completely deprive it of its harmful potential. Utterances of 
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slurs in controlled contexts still contribute to normalizing their utter-
ances in uncontrolled contexts, which makes nonderogatory occur-
rences of slurs potentially harmful too.  
Keywords: Context; derogation; nonderogatory occurrences of slurs; 
normalization; slurs. 
1. Introduction 
 Although slurs are conventionally defined as derogatory words, it has 
been widely noted that not all of their occurrences are derogatory. Cases of 
mention, in which we talk about the word rather than applying it to any-
body, are the ones that most straightforwardly come to mind (see e.g. 
Hornsby 2001, 129–30). However, some full-fledged uses of slurs are stand-
ardly taken to be nonderogatory too. Among these, two kinds of uses have 
been most discussed. On the one hand, members of the target group can 
appropriate a slur in order to demarcate the group or foster solidarity or 
feelings of belonging, thus being able to use it in a nonderogatory way (see 
Bianchi 2014; Cepollaro 2017). But, on the other hand, we can also find 
nonderogatory uses of slurs that are not instances of appropriation—what 
have been called nonderogatory, nonappropriated (NDNA) uses of slurs 
(Hom 2008; see also Croom 2011, and section 2 of this paper for examples).1 
The fact that not all occurrences of slurs are derogatory, as mentions, ap-
propriated and NDNA uses seem to prove, may lead us to think that there 
are “innocent” occurrences of slurs, i.e., occurrences of slurs that are not 
harmful in any sense. 
 The aim of this paper is to challenge this assumption. Our thesis is that 
slurs are always potentially harmful, even if some of their occurrences are 
nonderogatory. This does not mean that we take ourselves to be prohibi-
tionists (see Anderson and Lepore 2013a, 2013b; see also Cepollaro, Sulpizio 
and Bianchi 2019, 33). That is, we do not think that it should be morally 
forbidden to utter a slur even when it is mentioned, for instance, for  
                                                 
1  Other nonderogatory uses of slurs that have been discussed in the literature are 
referential (Anderson 2018) and identificatory (Zeman 2021) uses. We will briefly 
turn to these in section 3. 
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pedagogical purposes. But we do think that the utterance of a slur always 
comes at a moral cost, which in cases like this may be worth paying. 
 Our argument is the following. Derogatory occurrences of slurs (which, 
following Hom (2010), we call “orthodox occurrences”) are not characterized 
by their sharing any specific linguistic form; instead, they are those that 
take place in what we call uncontrolled contexts, that is, contexts in which 
we do not have enough knowledge of our audience to predict what the up-
take of the utterance will be. Slurs uttered in controlled contexts, by con-
trast, may lack derogatory character. However, although the kind of context 
at which the utterance of a slur takes place can make it nonderogatory, it 
cannot completely deprive it of its harmful potential. Utterances of slurs in 
controlled contexts still contribute to normalizing their utterances in un-
controlled contexts, which makes nonorthodox occurrences of slurs poten-
tially harmful too. It is not one of the aims of this paper to establish what 
makes utterances of slurs in uncontrolled contexts derogatory, nor in what 
sense exactly they are harmful. We just assume the common intuition that 
most occurrences of slurs are derogatory and in consequence harmful, and 
suggest that these coincide with those that take place in uncontrolled con-
texts. Our argument should be read as the conditional one that, if these 
occurrences of slurs are harmful, then all of them are potentially so. 
 Insofar as one of the outcomes of our work concerns the moral permis-
sibility of mentioning a slur, it points in the same direction as Herbert (ms.), 
who argues that we should be careful even when merely talking about slurs. 
Her argument is that, just by mentioning these words, we already trigger 
harmful implicit associations.2 Although we share Herbert’s concerns and 
reach a conclusion similar to hers, there are some differences between her 
work and ours that are worth commenting on. We will do so after presenting 
our argument. 
 The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we review the 
distinction between derogatory and nonderogatory occurrences of slurs in 
terms of Hom’s (2010) distinction between orthodox and nonorthodox oc-
currences of slurs. We argue that the difference between these two kinds of 
occurrences does not lie in the linguistic form of the sentence uttered, but 
                                                 
2  We are greatly indebted to Cassie Herbert for kindly sharing her manuscript 
with us. 
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in the context at which each of them takes place. In section 3, we flesh out 
what exactly this supposes by distinguishing between controlled and uncon-
trolled contexts; occurrences of slurs in uncontrolled contexts are always 
derogatory, while occurrences in controlled contexts may not be so. In sec-
tion 4, we argue that occurrences of slurs in controlled contexts, even if 
sometimes not derogatory, have a normalizing potential that makes occur-
rences of slurs in uncontrolled contexts more likely. Hence, that an occur-
rence of a slur is nonderogatory does not mean that it does not have the 
potential to harm. We end the section by comparing our view with Herbert’s 
(ms.). In section 5, finally, we discuss some of the consequences that our 
point may have for philosophical practice. 
2. Nonorthodox occurrences of slurs 
 In this section, we survey the different cases in which occurrences of 
slurs have been said to be nonderogatory. These will be the cases on which 
we will focus in subsequent sections to discuss whether the fact that they 
are not derogatory means that they are not problematic in any sense. At 
the end of the section, we will argue that these cases include uses of slurs, 
despite attempts to reduce all nonderogatory occurrences of slurs to cases 
of mention. 
 According to Hom (2010, 168–69), some occurrences of slurs (which he 
calls “orthodox occurrences”) are nondisplaceable, while others (which he 
calls “nonorthodox occurrences”) are displaceable. Orthodox occurrences 
are nondisplaceable because they are derogatory even when embedded, 
while nonorthodox occurrences are displaceable in the sense that they are 
not always derogatory. In this paper, we do not embrace a particularly 
precise conception of derogation. It should be enough to say that derogation 
is the application to an individual of a negative moral evaluation (Hom and 
May 2013, 310), which is “an objective feature of the semantic contents of 
pejorative terms”3 (Hom 2012, 397). This distinguishes derogation from 
                                                 
3  This is not incompatible with accepting that some occurrences of slurs are dero-
gatory and others are not. An occurrence of a slur can be nonderogatory because its 
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mere offense, which is a psychological phenomenon depending on the beliefs 
and values of participants in the conversation. Moreover, slurs, are opposed 
to mere insults, derogate its target in virtue of their belonging to a certain 
social group. We will assume that this kind of derogation is harmful in some 
way—be it because it subordinates (Kukla 2018) or dehumanizes (Jeshion 
2018) its target. Let ‘S’ be a slur, and let us substitute it for the word that 
Hom uses in his examples of orthodox occurrences of slurs: 
(1)  If there are Ss in the building, then X will be relieved. 
(2)  There are no Ss in the building. 
(3)  Are there Ss in the building? 
(4)  John said that there are Ss in the building. 
(5)  John said: ‘There are Ss in the building.’. 
(6)  In the novel, there are Ss in the building. 
Hom takes ‘S’ to be derogatory in (1–6).4 He takes it to be so even if it 
appears in the antecedent of a conditional in (1), embedded under negation 
in (2), as part of a question in (3), reported in indirect style in (4) and in 
direct style in (5), and embedded under an “in the fiction” operator in (6) 
(see also Hornsby 2001, 129–130; Potts 2007, 166; Croom 2011, 347; Hom 
2012, 384–385; Anderson and Lepore 2013a, 30; Croom 2014, 228). However, 
he does not take ‘S’ to be derogatory in his example of a nonorthodox 
occurrence of a slur, which he takes from (Hom 2008, 429) and we reproduce 
here substituting ‘N’ for the (alleged) neutral counterpart of ‘S’:5 
(7)  Institutions that treat Ns as Ss are morally depraved. 
                                                 
semantic content does not result in derogation when it interacts with features of the 
particular linguistic environment or context of utterance. 
4  As Hom (2010, n. 17) acknowledges, occurrences of ‘S’ such as the one in (5) are 
not incontrovertibly derogatory. To support the claim that they are, Hom argues 
that a speaker who is not a member of the target group and is not racist would be 
reluctant to utter (5) in front of a member of the target group, and that this is at 
least partly explained by the fact that the occurrence of the slur in it is derogatory. 
This argument seems sound enough to us. 
5  We do not entirely agree with the idea that slurs have neutral counterparts, but 
we will assume throughout this paper that they do. For discussion on this issue, see 
Mühlebach (2019). 
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Hom takes (7) to contain a nonderogatory occurrence of ‘S’. Note that, in 
this case, ‘S’ is not embedded in any of the ways depicted in (1–6). In this 
paper, we will assume that Hom’s classification coincides with the intuitions 
of most speakers. Thus, we will take Hom’s diagnosis that (1–6) contain 
derogatory occurrences of ‘S’ and (7) does not as part of our data. 
 A couple of categories can be distinguished within nonorthodox occur-
rences of slurs. One of the cases that most readily come to mind is that of 
appropriated uses of slurs. Appropriated uses of slurs are those that take 
place when speakers belonging to the target group aim at demarcating the 
group or fostering solidarity or feelings of belonging (see Bianchi 2014; 
Cepollaro 2017; Anderson 2018). Speakers who have appropriated a slur can 
use it to refer to themselves or other members of the group without dero-
gating anyone. 
 But we can also find occurrences of slurs that are nonorthodox without 
being instances of appropriation. These have been aptly labeled “nonderoga-
tory, nonappropriated” (NDNA) uses of slurs, an umbrella term for all non-
orthodox uses of slurs that are not appropriated (Hom 2008; see also Croom 
2011). An example of an NDNA use of a slur (given by Hom 2008, 429) is: 
(8)  There are lots of Ns at Y, but no Ss. 
(7) would be another example of an NDNA use of a slur. 
 Appropriated and NDNA uses are both uses of slurs, but paradigmatic 
nonorthodox occurrences of slurs are mentions of them. In fact, Hornsby 
apparently endorses the idea that all nonorthodox occurrences of slurs are 
at the end of the day cases of mention: 
Certainly there are occurrences of derogatory words that are ut-
terly inoffensive: “He is not [an S]” can be said in order to reject 
the derogatory “[S]”; one can convey that “[S]” is not something 
one calls anyone by saying “There aren’t any [Ss].” But these 
examples do not count against their uselessness as I mean this, 
because they are examples in which it is part of the speaker’s 
message that she has no use for the word “[S]”. We might gloss 
the two sentences so that the word is mentioned rather than used: 
““[S]” is not what he ought to be called”; ““[S]” has no applica-
tion.” (Hornsby 2001, 129) 
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Hornsby seems to reduce all cases of nonorthodox occurrences of slurs to 
cases of mention rather than use. A plausible paraphrase of (7) in which ‘S’ 
is mentioned rather than used would be this: 
(9)  Institutions that treat Ns as deserving to be called ‘Ss’ are mor-
ally depraved. 
However, we do not think that Hom’s distinction between orthodox and 
nonorthodox occurrences of slurs should coincide with the distinction be-
tween use and mention, so that every sentence featuring a nonorthodox 
occurrence of a slur can be paraphrased as a case of mention. In fact, we do 
not think that the distinction between orthodox and nonorthodox occur-
rences of slurs is a linguistic distinction, in the sense that a criterion to 
distinguish the latter from the former can be given just in terms of the form 
of the sentence used. A sentence in which a slur is used can be derogatory 
or nonderogatory independently of whether the slur appears in the anteced-
ent of a conditional, embedded under negation, or as part of a question, and 
the same happens when the slur is merely mentioned. 
 The relevant factor when distinguishing between orthodox and nonor-
thodox occurrences of slurs is the context. (1) and (7) are both cases of use, 
but (1) is derogatory and (7) is not. (5) and (9) are both cases of mention, 
but (5) is derogatory and (9) is not. The differences lie in the kind of context 
that we most plausibly associate with each sentence: (1) is most easily im-
agined as uttered in a context in which an act of derogation takes place, 
while (7) tends to make us picture a context in which the speaker is in fact 
denouncing derogatory practices, and something parallel to this can be said 
about (5) and (9). 
 Thus, the difference between orthodox and nonorthodox occurrences of 
slurs does not lie in the form of the sentence used, but in the context in 
which they take place. In the next section, we flesh out what exactly dis-
tinguishes some contexts from others. However, as we will see, the difference 
has a limited impact, since it makes nonorthodox occurrences of slurs less 
dangerous, but not strictly not dangerous. 
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3. Controlled and uncontrolled contexts 
 The upshot of the previous section was that whether an occurrence of 
a slur is orthodox or nonorthodox depends on the context at which it takes 
place. In this section, we take a closer look at the kinds of contexts that 
make an occurrence of a slur orthodox or nonorthodox. In particular, we 
identify nonorthodox occurrences of slurs with those that can take place in 
what we call “controlled contexts” and orthodox occurrences of slurs with 
those that take place in “uncontrolled contexts”. However, we will see in 
section 4 that, even if the distinction between controlled and uncontrolled 
contexts can help us rank occurrences of slurs according to their derogatory 
character, part of slurs’ power to cause harm is distributed equally across 
the categories distinguished here. 
 Communication is a risky business. There are a number of factors that 
can have an impact on the kind of effect that a given utterance will have, 
and most of them escape our control. When communicating, we often have 
to manage without knowing what our audience knows or what their expec-
tations are. Still, even if rare, contexts can be found in which we can predict 
with reasonable accuracy what the consequences of a given utterance will 
be. We call these “controlled contexts”.6 When we are talking about utter-
ances including a slur, an example of a controlled context would ideally be 
a pedagogic one, and another, more contentious one would be that in which 
a slur is successfully used in an ironic way. 
 Here is an example of a pedagogic occurrence of a slur. Our son Dani 
comes home from school and says his friend Y says his other friend X is 
an S. Later on, we tell Dani he should never say that word again. ‘What 
word?’, he says. He has not forgotten it, but honestly cannot recall which 
one of the words he has pronounced we are forbidding him from saying. 
We feel forced to pronounce ‘S’ in order to make sure he knows what term 
we are referring to, so we do—we say ‘We don’t call people ‘S’, that’s an 
ugly thing to say.’. We have uttered a slur, even if we have only mentioned 
                                                 
6  Of course, whether a given context is a controlled one will in many cases not be 
a settled matter. We leave for further work to offer precise criteria for a context to 
fall under this label. 
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it.7 But we had no other option, and we can be sure that by doing this we 
have not insulted anyone—if anything, we have prevented Dani from in-
sulting anyone, even if from unintentionally doing so. We know enough 
about our own son to guarantee that he has understood that we were not 
insulting anyone. Here, the occurrence of ‘S’ is nonderogatory. 
 Here is another kind of case in which we can say that the utterance of 
a slur has taken place in a controlled context. This time, we are not talking 
about a mere mention of a slur, but about a full-blown use—an ironic use. 
We are a progressive group of friends who would never as much as mention 
a slur in front of strangers, much less use it to insult a person on grounds 
of her belonging to a given group. However, we find fun in imitating bigots’ 
mannerisms, and enjoy inner jokes that include ironic uses of ‘S’. We are 
completely sure that all our friends in the group share our sensibility, and 
that none of them will take us to aim at insulting anyone. We think it is 
intuitive to take occurrences of slurs such as these to be nonderogatory, 
whatever the form of the sentences in which they appear. 
 Other nonderogatory uses of slurs that have recently been described are 
referential (Anderson 2018) and identificatory (Zeman 2021) uses. Referen-
tial uses take place when members of the target group use a slur to address 
other members without any intention to appropriate the term, while iden-
tificatory uses take place when they simply take the word to be the one 
that refers to the group they take themselves to belong to. We take these 
uses to take place in controlled contexts too, as the speaker’s group mem-
bership is salient enough for her to be confident that the audience will un-
derstand that she did not mean to insult, just like happened in Dani’s case. 
 If controlled contexts are those in which we can be sure about the other 
participants’ knowledge and expectations, almost all contexts in which we 
can find ourselves are uncontrolled ones. It is difficult to know anyone as 
                                                 
7  It could be argued that pedagogic contexts not only allow for nonderogatory 
mentions of slurs, but also for nonderogatory uses of them. For instance, someone 
might claim, we could have also said to Dani ‘There are no Ss, only Ns.’. However, 
we find it hard to see this sentence as nonderogatory—the fact that the speaker has 
seen the need to categorize Dani’s friend as belonging to the target group, even if in 
a supposedly neutral way, makes the sentence problematic. See again Mühlebach 
(2019). 
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well as we know our own children or our closest friends, and in many cases 
we hardly have any relevant information about our audience. Consider our 
daily interactions with strangers, and the limiting case of the completely 
uncontrolled context in which public communication takes place. When we 
utter a slur in an uncontrolled context, our audience has every reason to 
attribute to us a negative attitude toward a given group, and we cannot 
reasonably expect not to be attributed such an attitude, which is what, in 
an intuitive sense, means to derogate (see section 2). Thus, in uncontrolled 
contexts, which are most of the contexts, occurrences of slurs are deroga-
tory. 
 As advanced before, it lies beyond the scope of this paper to offer an 
explanation of exactly how slurs derogate when uttered in an uncontrolled 
context. There are a number of proposals in the market that aim at ac-
counting for this fact. Some of these views rely on specifically derogatory 
content that is part of what is said (Hom 2008, 2010, 2012; Hom and May 
2013), conventionally implicated (Potts 2007; Copp 2009; Williamson 2009; 
McCready 2010; Whiting 2013), or presupposed (Macià 2002; Schlenker 
2007; Cepollaro and Stojanovic 2016; Marques and García-Carpintero 
2020). Some of them, by contrast, explain the derogatory character of slurs 
without appealing to specifically derogatory content (Anderson and Lepore 
2013a, 2013b). At any rate, these are all different ways of accounting for 
the widely held intuition that, in most of the cases, occurrences of slurs are 
derogatory. 
 A plausible objection is that slurs can occur in a derogatory way in 
controlled contexts too. I may know exactly what the reaction of the audi-
ence to my utterance of a slur will be, and know this reaction to be one 
that will precisely result in derogation. In this case, the occurrence of the 
slur will be derogatory even if it takes place in a controlled context. Note, 
however, that what distinguishes controlled and uncontrolled contexts is 
that occurrences of slurs in the former can be nonderogatory, not that they 
will always be so. 
 Another plausible objection, mirroring the one above, is the following. 
In uncontrolled contexts, we cannot be sure that the uptake of our utterance 
will fail to derogate, but this does not mean that it will derogate. It may 
happen that, just by chance, every single member of the audience  
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understands the occurrence of the slur as nonderogatory, even if we are not 
able to predict that this will be the case. For instance, all bystanders who 
hear Dani utter a slur could assume that he does not know what the word 
means.8 Note, however, that we have characterized uncontrolled contexts 
as those in which hearers have every reason to attribute to us a negative 
attitude toward the target group, which we cannot in turn reasonably ex-
pect not to be attributed to us. In this case, the audience can refuse to 
attribute the negative attitude to us. However, inasmuch as they would be 
warranted in so doing, our utterance can be taken to be derogatory. 
 Of course, what counts as good reason is a highly context-dependent 
issue, and some contexts might make it reasonable not to attribute a nega-
tive attitude to the speaker. This may be the case, for instance, when the 
audience knows that the speaker is a decent person. Note, however, that 
this will only be warranted if the audience knows not only that the speaker 
is a decent person, but also that the speaker is aware that this is publicly 
known. In this case, the audience will have reason to believe that the utter-
ance is not derogatory, but we will no longer be facing an uncontrolled 
context. If the relevant piece of public knowledge is missing, as should hap-
pen in an uncontrolled context, and the speaker still chooses to utter the 
slur, the audience can legitimately conclude that she is comfortable with 
being attributed a negative attitude. 
 This idea that, in uncontrolled contexts, it is reasonable to attribute the 
utterer of a slur a negative attitude toward the target group no matter what 
her actual attitudes are is similar to one that has been defended by La-
sersohn (2007). This idea is a key component in Lasersohn’s explanation of 
the hyperprojectivity of slurs’ derogatory content. Hyperprojectivity is the 
phenomenon whereby the derogatory content of slurs is able, in many oc-
casions, to survive in grammatical constructions that would usually block 
presuppositional content. Lasersohn defends that this fact is compatible 
with a presuppositional account of slurs by providing the following expla-
nation. According to Lasersohn, slurs are emotionally charged terms, so 
uttering them entails a social risk. Lasersohn believes that speakers are 
aware of the social burden of slurs, and this is the main reason why most 
                                                 
8  Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for Organon F for suggesting this objection 
to us. 
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speakers avoid uttering slurs—because, whatever their particular attitudes, 
they are aware that they can reasonably be attributed bigotry. Precisely 
because of this, when a speaker does utter a slur, it makes sense to think 
that she is comfortable with being identified as a bigot, and this is how the 
derogatory content of the slur projects where most presupposed content 
does not (Lasersohn 2007, 228). Like Lasersohn, we think that, if a speaker 
utters a slur in an uncontrolled context in which it is even merely possible 
that someone understands the occurrence of the slur as derogatory, it makes 
sense to take the speaker to be comfortable with this possibility, and thus 
to take the occurrence to be actually derogatory. 
4. The normalizing potential of slurs 
 We have seen that slurs are derogatory in uncontrolled contexts, but 
not in controlled contexts such as pedagogic and ironic ones. Still, no matter 
how carefully we arrange the current context to make sure that the utter-
ance of a slur does not have the kind of effect we want to avoid, it will 
facilitate ulterior occurrences of the term. In particular, it will make the 
slur more likely to appear in uncontrolled contexts in which the utterance 
of the slur is derogatory. In this section, we explore how this could be the 
case with the two kinds of occurrences of slurs that we presented in the 
previous section—pedagogic mentions and ironic uses of slurs. If even the 
apparently most “innocent” occurrences of slurs, such as those that take 
place in pedagogic contexts, are potentially harmful, it is natural to con-
clude that all occurrences of slurs are potentially harmful. 
 Let us start with the irony case. Remember that, in this case, we are a 
progressive group of friends who enjoy using slurs in an ironic way to make 
fun of bigots. However, we have ironically used ‘S’ in our friend group so 
many times that we have deprived it of its forbidden character—it no longer 
makes us uncomfortable to hear the word, which makes its utterance in 
uncontrolled contexts more likely now. This nonderogatory use of a slur 
thus normalizes derogatory occurrences of the word, and is potentially 
harmful in this sense. Of course, our friend group could be careful enough 
not to let uses of slurs slip out of the controlled context. This is why ironic 
uses of slurs such as these are not harmful tout court, but potentially  
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harmful. But, since potential harm implies actual danger, these uses are 
dangerous tout court. 
 Now, take the example involving a pedagogic mention of a slur, also 
described in the previous section. Remember that, in this case, we feel forced 
to utter the word ‘S’ in order to make our son Dani aware that he should 
not call anyone an S. However, we have taught Dani what ‘S’ means, thus 
giving him the tools to use the word to insult if he wants to do so at some 
point. Note that, at least in this case, the risk that Dani grows up to use 
‘S’ as an insult may be worth it: as we will see, preventing an actual risk 
may be preferable to preventing a virtual one. In this sense, this case might 
strike us as clearer than the previous one. The normalizing potential is 
similar in both cases, though. The difference is that, in the pedagogic case, 
it is clearer how the benefits could outweigh the potential harm. In the 
irony case, all we have on the positive side is the fun we have with our 
friends. Referential and identificatory uses of slurs are closer to pedagogic 
mentions than to ironic uses in this respect. Like with pedagogic mentions, 
however, there is still the risk that these uses facilitate ulterior occurrences 
of the term in contexts in which the group membership of the speaker, 
although salient, does not make the audience understand such occurrences 
as nonderogatory because the speaker does not belong to the target group. 
Hence, the moral here is that we may have full control over the present 
context, but we do not have control over all possible future contexts. Thus, 
slurs always have normalizing potential. The slur might not be problematic 
in the context at which it is uttered, but it may reveal itself to be so as we 
look beyond the original conversation and consider other exchanges that 
might be facilitated by the original utterance. We take something to be 
dangerous whenever it may cause harm, even if it does not actually do so. 
Insofar as occurrences of slurs are always potentially harmful, therefore, we 
take them to be always dangerous. 
 As we said in the introduction to this paper, our idea that even non-
derogatory occurrences of slurs can be harmful should not suffice to classify 
us as prohibitionists (see Anderson and Lepore 2013a, 2013b; see also Cepol-
laro, Sulpizio and Bianchi 2019, 33)—we do not think utterances of a slur 
should be forbidden tout court. We think there are some practical conse-
quences to the categorization of some uses of slurs as appropriated or 
Beyond the Conversation: The Pervasive Danger of Slurs 721 
Organon F 28 (3) 2021: 708–725 
NDNA, and that the distinction between use and mention has practical 
consequences when it comes to slurs too. It may be permissible to mention 
a slur in certain contexts, just like it may be permissible to make an appro-
priated or an NDNA use of a slur. This marks a difference between these 
occurrences of slurs and their full-blown, derogatory uses. But we should be 
aware that these practices come with a moral cost too. The price may be 
worth paying, of course. It just misrepresents our moral life to assume that 
it consists in choosing the only permissible thing to do in each case; rather, 
we assess the moral costs and benefits of each course of action, decide what 
weight to give to each, and act in consequence.9 The moral benefits of per-
forming a certain utterance of a slur might outweigh the pervasive moral 
cost we have described, and so it might be worth it to utter the slur. 
 As we also advanced in the introduction to this paper, the stance that 
merely mentioning a slur, as we do in the pedagogic case, can be reprehen-
sible too has been defended before us. Herbert (ms.) argues that the practice 
of offering examples of slurs, which is widespread in philosophy, may cause 
harm just like using them does. To conclude this, she relies on empirical 
evidence found by Carnaghi and Maass (2008) and Fasoli, Paladino, Car-
naghi, Jetten, Bastian and Bain (2015) that it is mere exposure to a slur, 
rather than specifically exposure to uses of a slur, that triggers negative 
implicit associations concerning the target group. The question that Herbert 
asks herself (is it morally permissible to mention a slur?) is precisely one of 
those we have set ourselves to answer in this paper, and the reply she offers 
is akin to ours—a refusal to give a context-independent answer, together 
with an invitation to be extremely careful when deciding whether to men-
tion a slur. However, there are some differences between Herbert’s work and 
ours that we think make this paper a worthy contribution to the debate. 
 First, Herbert’s work focuses on mentions of slurs, while ours also covers 
some of their uses, such as ironic ones. Of course, this does not mean that 
Herbert’s point applies only to mention. The way her argument goes, men-
tions of slurs are potentially harmful just in virtue of their being occurrences 
of slurs, so her conclusion should apply to any occurrence of these words, 
including uses in general and ironic uses in particular. But, while most of 
                                                 
9  For a really insightful guide on what particular factors to consider when deciding 
whether a slur is worth mentioning, see Herbert (ms.). 
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the discussion in Herbert’s paper concerns mentions of slurs in academic 
and journalistic environments, ours concerns ironic uses and mentions of 
slurs in pedagogic contexts. 
 Second, our explanation of how these occurrences of slurs can end up 
being harmful is more general than Herbert’s. While she relies on implicit 
associations, our argument is compatible with different proposals as to what 
mechanism accounts for the pernicious effects that uttering a slur may have, 
possibly including the appearance of implicit associations like the ones de-
scribed by Herbert. If (contrarily to the evidence we now have) occurrences 
of slurs turned out not to elicit implicit associations per se, our work would 
still provide a schema that could be completed with an alternative mecha-
nism. 
5. Concluding remarks 
 In this paper, we have argued that the mere utterance of a slur has 
a certain kind of impact—it normalizes further occurrences of the word. 
This is so even in those cases in which the slur does not derogate anyone. 
Nothing prevents the slur from being used in a derogatory way in the 
ulterior occurrences normalized by these ones, so even nonderogatory oc-
currences make it more likely for derogation to take place at some point 
in the future. 
 Our proposal has consequences for philosophical practice as we know it. 
Our point is that mentions of slurs in academic papers are potentially harm-
ful too: even if, not being used, they are not derogatory, they facilitate 
ulterior occurrences of the slur in question too. Of course, not all philoso-
phers are comfortable with mentioning slurs even if they take it to be nec-
essary. Rebecca Kukla, for instance, says: 
By flagging that I will be mentioning slurs and reminding the 
reader that even the mention of slurs can harm, I hope to frame 
these mentions in a way that allows readers to be conscious of 
such effects and to try to minimize it. I also use scare quotes 
around the slurs throughout, to help avoid normalizing them as 
part of everyday speech, and in the hope of marking them at the 
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visual level as problematic terms that I am not uttering in my 
own voice and that are not to be taken for granted as readable. 
(Kukla 2018, 24) 
We do not think the use of scare quotes blocks normalization, but again, 
this does not mean that Kukla’s mentions of slurs are necessarily unjusti-
fied. The moral cost might be worth assuming in this case. We keep our 
doubts, however, that it is worth assuming in cases in which more examples 
than the strictly necessary are given. 
 We do not think that a criterion can be found by which certain occur-
rences of a slur should be allowed, but by the same token we do not think 
that there is a criterion that forbids the rest of occurrences tout court. Our 
point is that uttering a slur always comes at a moral cost, and it is the 
responsibility of the speaker, or the philosopher who writes a paper on slurs, 
to assess such cost and decide whether it is worth it to mention a word to 
explain to a child that it should never be used or to give one more example 
of a slur in a paper addressed to an audience that is assumed to know what 
slurs are. 
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